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THE OUTLOOK FOR WELFARE LITIGATION IN THE

FEDERAL COURTS: HAGANS v. LAVINE &
EDELMAN v. JORDAN
The categorical assistance programs, supported by grants-inaid from the federal government, provide the primary source of
public welfare in the United States. Under this system, the states
administer funds to various categories of needy individuals
through programs defined by the Social Security Act and financed
by both federal and state revenues.' Although states are not
required to make categorical assistance available to their indigent

citizens, states that choose to exercise this option may obtain
federal matching funds only by complying with certain requirements of the Social Security Act.2 Failure of a state plan to contain
the necessary elements of a categorical assistance program may
result in administrative sanctions, the most drastic of which is the
loss of federal matching funds.3 However, these administrative
remedies are only available to HEW.4 Welfare recipients are entitled to participate in conformity hearings, 5 but have no legal
authority to initiate this process. As a result, federal litigation has
become the predominant method by which welfare recipients are
able to challenge whether state plans conform to federal requirements. The availability of federal jurisdiction over welfare claims
7
therefore becomes of obvious importance.
I The present federal-state programs that will be most severely affected by the material
discussed in this Note are Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Emergency
Assistance to Needy Families with Children (EANFC), Medicaid, Food Stamps, and Unemployment Compensation. On January 1, 1974, the Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind,
and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled programs were replaced by a single
federal program, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), which changed the jurisdictional
complexion of their litigation. Although the Hagans decision, insofar as it applies to the
substantiality requirement (see notes 21-29 infra), is applicable to all welfare litigation in the
federal courts, the remainder of the issues discussed in this Note arise from conflicts
between state assistance programs and the corresponding federal act and may not be the
same as those issues raised in SSI litigation. See Note, FederalJurisdictionOver Federal Welfare
Claims, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 800, 800-02 (1975); Note, 1974 Developments in Welfare Law-The
Supplemental Security Income Program, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 825 (1975).
2 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (Supp. III, 1973).
3 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 604 (1970).
4 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 604 (1970). Section 604 provides that the Secretary of HEW may,
"after reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing," terminate federal aid to a state whose
plan fails to conform to any requirement of § 602(a).
5 45 C.F.R. § 213.15 (1974).
6 See note 62 and accompanying text infra.
7 See Redlich, The Art of Welfare Advocacy: Available Procedures and Forums, 36 ALBANY L.
REV. 57 (1971); Note, FederalJurisdictionOver Challenges to State Welfare Programs, 72 COLUM.
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Two recent Supreme Court decisions should have a profound,
albeit contradictory, effect on federal jurisdiction over challenges
to these categorical assistance programs. Hagans v. Lavine8 recognizes an expansive definition of the substantiality concept in federal
subject matter jurisdiction and may open the federal courts to a
wider variety of challenges to state assistance programs. Edelman v.
Jordan,9 on the other hand, promises to greatly limit the usefulness
of federal adjudication as a means for redressing the grievances of
individual welfare claimants.
I
Hagans v. Lavine AND SECTION 1343 JURISDICTION
A.

Section 1343(3)-The Requirement of a Substantial Question

Under traditional doctrine, an action alleging that a state
categorical assistance program has failed to conform to the structure required by the Social Security Act ° must satisfy the $10,000
jurisdictional amount requirement of section 1331.11 Under section
1343(3)12, however, there is federal jurisdiction over certain other
claims, such as allegations of constitutional infirmity, regardless of
the amount in controversy. 3 Furthermore, since the Supreme
Court declared in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.14 that the
"rights, privileges and immunities" that give rise to jurisdiction
under section 1343(3) include all constitutional rights, there has
been no doubt that section 1343(3) grants federal jurisdiction over
L. REV. 1404 (1972); Note, FederalJurisdiction Over Federal Welfare Claims, 60 CORNELL L.
REV. 800, 802 (1975).
8 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
9 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
10 For a discussion of an alternative assertion of federal jurisdiction over these so-called
"statutory" daims see notes 32-39 and accompanying text infra.
" The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970). For a discussion of the difficulties welfare litigants confront in
satisfying this requirement, see Note, CORNELL L. REv., supra note 7, at 809-17.
12 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
13 § 1343. Civil rights and elective franchise
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by
the -Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
Id.

14

405 U.S. 538 (1972).
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constitutional challenges to state welfare programs.' 5 The majority
of claims challenging the conformity of a state plan to federal
statutory requirements are therefore asserted pendent to constitutional claims and, under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction,
require no independent source of federal jurisdiction. 1 6 Where a
constitutional claim of sufficient substance to support federal jurisdiction is alleged, a district court may hear the statutory claim of
inconsistency between federal and state law without initially determining whether the statutory issue, in its own right, is cognizable in
7
the federal courts.'
In this context the sole question confronting a plaintiff's claim
of justiciability is whether the alleged constitutional claim is of
sufficient substance to give a federal court subject matter jurisdiction. Because most welfare claims allege a denial of equal protection or due process, the restrictive equal protection standard anv ' 8 has in recent years had a
nounced in Dandridge v. Williams
negative effect on the jurisdictional sufficiency of such constitutional claims. In Dandridge, the Court stated that "a State does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some
'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution ...."19
Numerous federal courts, in accordance with the apparent
mandate of Dandridge, subsequently found the constitutional allegations of welfare litigants lacking in sufficient substance to confer
15See Note, COLUM. L. REV., supra note 7, at 1408-12.
16 The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction may be invoked whenever (1) there is a claim
that has sufficient substance to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, and (2) the
jurisdiction conferring claim and the pendent claim derive from "a common nucleus of
operative fact." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). See 2J. MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE
18.07 [1.2]-[1.4] (1974).
The exercise of pendent jurisdiction is not mandatory, but is within the discretion of the
court in the interests of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants. United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Therefore, before jurisdiction can be
exercised, the court must consider two questions: (1) whether there is judicial power to
adjudicate the pendent claim, and (2) whether the court should exercise that discretionary
power.
An in-depth consideration of the above factors is beyond the scope of this Note. For
such a discussion, see Note, COLUM. L. REV., supra note 7, at 1413-17. See also Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 545-50 (1974). In most welfare actions challenging the validity of a
state plan, the constitutional and statutory claims will arise from the same factual basis-the
reduction, termination, or alteration of a recipient's benefits in accordance with a state
statute or regulation.
17 New York Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 412 n.11(1973); Rosado v.
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403-05 (1970).
18 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
19 Id. at 485.
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subject matter jurisdiction, 20 and accordingly dismissed both the
constitutional allegations and the appended statutory claims. The
high-water mark of this trend was reached in Hagans v. Wyman, 2 1
where the Second Circuit, citing the Dandridge guidelines for
evaluating equal protection claims in social welfare cases, held that
a substantial constitutional claim was not advanced because the
challenged regulation had a rational basis. 22 Since no substantial
constitutional claim was presented, the district court was not empowered to consider the statutory claim urged by the plaintiffs. If
logically extended, this judicial outlook would result in many
challenges to state categorical assistance programs being denied
federal adjudication on a preliminary determination that some
rational basis for the regulation or statute could be advanced.23
Fortunately for welfare litigants, the Supreme Court, in reversing the Second Circuit, eliminated this severe limitation on federal
jurisdiction over welfare actions and substituted what appears to be
a liberal and expansive expression of the "substantial question"
requirement.2 4 Asserting that Dandridge "evinced no intention to
suspend the operation of the Equal Protection Clause in the field
of social welfare law,' 25 the Court announced that the fundamental
question, in determining whether a claim is beyond the jurisdiction
of the district court, is whether the issue raised by the pleadings is
either frivolous or too insubstantial for consideration.26 Moreover,
20 For example, in Money v. Swank, 432 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1970), the plaintiffs
challenged, on due process and equal protection grounds, a state regulation which provided
welfare recipients attending vocational school with educational allowances, but denied
similar payments to most recipients attending college. In reviewing the district court's
finding that no substantial constitutional question was raised, the court of appeals held that
Dandridge was dispositive of the issue, not because Dandridge decided the same issue, but
because of the equal protection test it presented. The court viewed the appropriate question,
in deciding whether federal jurisdiction existed, to be "whether the classification was so
lacking in reasonableness and justification as to be invasive of [the plaintiff's] constitutional
rights." Id. at 1143; accord, Aguayo v. Richardson, 352 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Contra,
Pordum v. Board of Regents, 357 F. Supp. 222 (N.D.N.Y. 1973); Doe v. Gillman, 347 F.
Supp. 483 (N.D. Iowa 1972).
21 471 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974). In
Hagans, the plaintiffs challenged a New York recoupment regulation, alleging that it violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and that it contravened pertinent
provisions of the Social Security Act and regulations promulgated thereunder.
22 471 F.2d at 349.
213See 471 F.2d at 347. In deciding the jurisdictional issue, the court agreed that
"statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it." Id. at 349, quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970),
quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
2'4 Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
25 Id. at 539.
26 Id. at 538-39.
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according to the Court, a claim will be insubstantial "only if 'its
unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of this
court as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the
inference that the questions sought to be raised can be the subject
of controversy'," 2 7 and will be frivolous only where the challenged
statute or regulation is "so patently rational as to require no
2
meaningful consideration.1
Under the Supreme Court's formulation, a federal court will
lack jurisdiction only where a constitutional claim is obviously without merit or foreclosed by previous decisions of the Court. Since
Hagans, the relatively few cases that have confronted the section
1343(3) jurisdictional issue have consistently recognized the broad
assertion of federal jurisdiction over welfare litigation expressed
29
therein.
Although Hagans's liberal jurisdictional formula focuses on the
substantiality of plaintiff's constitutional claims, the decision's impact ironically will result in the consideration of "statutory" claims,
which previously would not have been the subject of federal
adjudication under the Dandridge equal protection analysis.3 0 In27 Id. at 538 (the quoted language originally came from Hannis Distilling Co. v.

Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285, 288 (1910)).
28 Id. at 541. The Court approved its earlier explanation of the application of the
substantiality doctrine:
"Constitutional insubstantiality" . . . has been equated with such concepts as
"essentially fictitious"; "wholly insubstantial"; "obviously frivolous"; and "obviously
without merit." The limiting words "wholly" and "obviously" have cogent legal
significance.... mhose words import that claims are constitutionally insubstantial
only if the prior decisions inescapably render the claim frivolous; previous decisions
that merely render claims of doubtful or questionable merit do not render them
insubstantial ....
Id. at 537-38, quoting Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973) (citations omitted).
29 For example, in Murrow v. Clifford, 502 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1974), the court, after
applying the following test, found jurisdiction over a claim that the denial of AFDC benefits
to a pregnant woman violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment:
To be jurisdictionally insubstantial a claim must be so attenuated and unsubstantial
as to be absolutely devoid of merit, or clearly foreclosed by the decisions of the
Supreme Court so as to leave no room for the inference that the questions sought
to be raised can be the subject of controversy.
Id. at 1068. Accord, Doe v. Rampton, 497 F.2d 1032 (10th Cir. 1974); Doe v. Lukhard, 493
F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1974).
This view was epitomized by the decision in J.A. and M.M. v. Riti, 337 F. Supp. 1046
(D.N.J. 1974). Whereas some courts had previously refused to accept jurisdiction over a
constitutional claim where some rational basis for the challenged statute or regulation was
presented, the court in Riti acknowledged that the Hagans test called for the exercise of
federal jurisdiction whenever some colorable doubt concerning the validity of a constitutional claim might be entertained by the court. Id.
30 Statutory claims generally present a stronger basis for relief than constitutional
allegations. Justice Rehnquist has asserted that despite the earlier admonition of the Court
that "the Federal question must not be merely colorable or fraudulently set up for the mere
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creased litigation in the federal courts challenging state categorical assistance programs on the basis of the Social Security Act is
assured by the Court's directive in Hagans that where there is
jurisdiction over a constitutional claim the pendent "statutory"
claim not only may, but3should be, adjudicated before the constitutional issue is reached. '
B. Jurisdiction Over Supremacy Clause Claims
Even under Hagans there may be situations in which a litigant
will not be able to frame a colorable constitutional claim of
sufficient substance. For example, in Randall v. Goldmark3 2 a federal
court held that the alleged due process and equal protection claims
lacked the requisite substantiality. 3 Nevertheless, because many
welfare claims arguably involve incompatability between state practices, regulations, or statutes and the federal scheme, plaintiffs'
attacks may still be couched in terms of supremacy clause violations.3 4 Although in recent years the Supreme Court has consispurpose of endeavoring to give the court jurisdiction," (quoting Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R.,
213 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1909)), the Court's decision in Hagans, by its heavy emphasis on
deciding state issues in preference to constitutional ones, implies that pendent jurisdiction
should be exercised even when a constitutional claim is pleaded for the mere purpose of
conferring jurisdiction on the federal court. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 555 (1974)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
31 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), outlined the wide discretion a
district court has over pendent claims. The majority in Hagans circumscribed that discretion
by characterizing Gibbs as
oriented to state law claims pendent to federal daims conferring jurisdiction on the
District Court. Pendent jurisdiction over state claims was described as a doctrine of
discretion not to be routinely exercised without considering the advantages of
judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants.
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 545 (1974). The Court in Hagans found that Gibbs
contemplated adjudication of pendent daims when advantages of economy and convenience
and no unfairness to litigants were present. And in the field of social welfare law,
adjudication rather than dismissal of pendent state claims was warranted by at least two
additional considerations: (1) the Court's policy of not deciding federal constitutional
questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available (id. at 546-47); and (2)
the considerations favoring state adjudication, such as "comity and the desirability of having
a reliable and final determination of the state claim by state courts having more familiarity
with the controlling principles and the authority to render a final judgment," are "wholly
irrevelant where the pendent daim is federal but is itself beyond the jurisdiction of the
District Court for failure to satisfy the amount in controversy." 415 U.S. at 548 (emphasis in
original).
32 495 F.2d 356 (Ist Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974).
33 This decision was reached even though the court could point to no Supreme Court
decision foreclosing the issue which plaintiffs had raised. Apparently, the court considered
the regulation "so patently rational as to require no meaningful consideration." Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 541 (1974). See Randall v. Goldmark, 495 F.2d 356, 359 n.5 (1st Cir.
1974).
34 Ifa state policy is in conflict with the federal statute, there is arguably a denial of "the
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tently refused to decide whether this conflict question is itself a
constitutional matter over which the federal courts have jurisdiction under section 1343(3), a3 the Hagans court suggested that the
question may ultimately be answered in the affirmative.3 6 The
Court noted that a suit to invalidate a state policy which conflicts
with a federal statute cannot succeed without resort to the federal
Constitution.3 7 It further acknowledged that such a claim, "although denominated 'statutory,' [was] in reality a constitutional
38
claim arising under the Supremacy Clause.
One can present a compelling argument that section 1343(3)
provides a proper jurisdictional basis for a federal court to entertain an independent supremacy clause claim. Accordingly,
whenever a welfare litigant is unable to fashion an alternative
colorable constitutional issue, the allegation that there is a conflict
between state and federal law should be presented in this manner.

39

II
RETROACTIVE BENEFITS AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT:
THE Edelman DECISION

Once the jurisdictional barrier has been overcome, the potential welfare litigant must still seek an appropriate remedy. One
benefit of the Supremacy Clause." Connecticut Union of Welfare Employees v. White, 55
F.R.D. 481, 486 (D. Conn. 1972).
35 To date, the Supreme Court has found jurisdiction under § 1343 only in cases that
involved a substantial constitutional claim other than the conflict question itself. See, e.g.,
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). But on at least three occasions the Court
has specifically left open the question of § 1343 jurisdiction based solely on grounds of
inconsistency with federal statutes. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 n.5; Rosado v.
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 405 n.7 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 n.3 (1968).
36 415 U.S. at 533 n.5.
37 Id.
:3 Id. at 549. One federal court has recendy recognized the conflict between state law
and the Social Security Act as a constitutional issue. Stuart v. Canary, 367 F. Supp. 1343
(N.D. Ohio 1973), held that plaintiff's sole claim, that the Ohio policy of denying AFDC
benefits to the unborn was inconsistent with § 406(a) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
§ 406(a) (1970)) and therefore violated the supremacy clause, gave the federal courtjurisdiction under § 1343(3). Contra, Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d 170, 177-78 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd
on other grounds, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Prigmore v. Renfro, 356 F. Supp. 427, 430 (N.D. Ala.
1972); Gage v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 356 F. Supp. 80 (N.D. 111. 1972). Furthermore,
the Supreme Court in Hagans repeatedly referred to the pendent claim as either the
supremacy clause issue or the "so called 'statutory' claim." See, e.g., 415 U.S. at 532.
3' An alternative method to obtain federal jurisdiction is to allege a cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and then claim jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970).
See Gomez v. Florida State Employment Service, 417 F.2d 569, 580 n.39 (5th Cir. 1969);
Note, COLUM. L. REV., supra note 7, at 1427-28.
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remedy, which is essential to welfare litigation and to the equitable
administration of any welfare system, is the award of retroactive
benefits. 40 Federal fair hearing regulations require that plans for
state participation in federally-funded programs provide for corrective payments to be made retroactively in cases where a welfare
claimant is denied aid because of an incorrect action by the state
welfare agency. 4 1 In 1970, HEW also sought passage of a bill that
would have given the agency authority to require retroactive payments to eligible persons who had initially been denied benefits.
The bill failed to pass the House of Representatives. 4 2 However,
the Supreme Court, on the theory that retroactive payments constitute an award of an accrued monetary liability which must be
satisfied out of the general revenues of the state, 4 3 has recently
held that the eleventh amendment 44 bars a federal court from
making an award of such benefits. 45 Plaintiffs in Edelman v. Jor40 For purposes of this Note, retroactive benefits include all payments for which welfare
litigants were eligible, but which they did not receive. The optimal result for the welfare
litigant is the recovery of all such wrongfully withheld benefits, i.e., a retroactive award of
benefits with the issuance of an injunction prohibiting the invalid practices in the future.
41 The regulations provide:
(a) State plan requirements. A State plan under title I, IV-A, X, XIV, XVI or XIX of
the Social Security Act shall provide for a system of hearings under which:

(18) When the hearing decision is favorable to the claimant, or when the agency
decides in favor of the claimant prior to the hearing, the agency shall promptly
make corrective payments retroactively to the date the incorrect action was taken.
45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(18) (1974).
In addition, HEW regulations authorize federal matching funds for retroactive assistance payments made pursuant to court order. Id. §§ 205. 10(b)(2), (b)(3).
42 H.R. 16311, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 407(a) (1970). See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON
FINANCE, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS., THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE Acr OF 1970 169-70 (Comm. Print
1970).
43 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). This decision came as a surprise because the
Supreme Court had previously affirmed four awards of retroactive benefits without discussing the eleventh amendment issue. Sterrett v. Mothers' & Children's Rights Organization,
409 U.S. 809 (1972); Department of Health & Rehabilitative Serv. v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918
(1972); Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
44 U.S. CONSr. amend. XI:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
Although the eleventh amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a state by
citizens of that state, the Supreme Court has consistently held that an unconsenting state is
immune from suits brought in the federal courts by its own citizens as well as by citizens of
another state. Parden v. Terminal R.R., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read,
322 U.S. 47 (1944); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311 (1920); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1 (1890). It is also well established that even though a state is not named a party to the
action, the suit may nonetheless be barred by the amendment. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
45 The Supreme Court has strongly suggested that this eleventh amendment bar is a
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dan4 6 successfully charged that eligibility determinations for the
federal-state programs of Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled
(AABD) were not made within the federal time limitations, 47 and
that initial payments were made later than the date required by
federal law. 48 Many applicants, although eligible under federal law,
had been denied benefits by Illinois public aid officials who were
administering payments pursuant to state regulations, instead of
federal law. 4 9 The district court, finding these regulations invalid
insofar as they were inconsistent with the federal regulations,
granted the plaintiffs a permanent injunction which required compliance with the federal time limits for processing applications and
initiating payments, and ordered retroactive payments to eligible
applicants whose applications50had not been processed within the
appropriate time limitations.
The court of appeals affirmed, 5 1 and on certiorari the Supreme Court held that, although the eleventh amendment did not
prevent federal courts from ordering state officials to cease uncon52
stitutional conduct or conduct in contravention of federal law,
limit on the exercise of federal jurisdiction: "The Eleventh Amendment declares a policy
and sets forth an explicit limitation on federal judicial power .... " Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 467 (1945). "IT]he Eleventh Amendment defense
sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the
trial court." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974).
46 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
47 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(3) (1973) provides in pertinent part:
(a) State plan requirements. A State plan . . . shall provide that:

(3) A decision shall be made promptly on applications, pursuant to reasonable
State-established time standards not in excess of:
(i) 45 days [for aid to aged and blind] .

. .

. and

(ii) 60 days [for aid to disabled].
48 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(8) (1970); 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(6) (1972).
Under this regulation assistance must be granted no later than the date of authorization
of payment, which must be within either 45 or 60 days of application. See note 47 supra.
49 The state regulations provided that assistance was to be effective from the first day of
the month in which eligibility was determined. Illinois Department of Public Aid, ILLINOIS
CATEGORICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL § 8255.1 (quoted at 415 U.S. 651, 655 n.4 (1974)).
50 Jordan v. Swank, [1972-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP. 15,135 (N.D. Ill.
1972), aff'd sub nom. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
51 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973).
52 This principle was established in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In Young, the
Attorney General of Minnesota was ordered by injunction to conform the future conduct of
his office to the requirements of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court surmounted the eleventh amendment objection with the fiction that when a state official seeks
to enforce a state law that conflicts with paramount federal law he is "stripped of his official
or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his
individual conduct." Id. at 160. See Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretendingto Sue an
Officer, 29 U. Cm. L. REV. 435, 437 (1962).
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the federal courts, under the rule that "a suit by private parties
seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds
in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment,"5 3 did
lack jurisdiction to order the payment of retroactive benefits.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court distinguished the fiscal
consequences to state treasuries which necessarily result from complying with decrees that are by their terms prospective in nature5 4
-an ancillary effect which is a permissible and often inevitable
consequence of the principle announced in Ex parte Young 55 -from
those consequences which result from the payment of state funds as
compensation for violations of federal law during a period when
neither the state nor its officers or agencies had been under any
court-imposed obligation to conform to a different standard 5 6 -a
result barred by the Constitution. Although the actual fiscal consequences may not always be clearly divergent, 57 the Edelman Court
held that while the eleventh amendment prohibited the federal
courts from requiring the retroactive payment of state funds as a
form of compensation, it did not preclude the federal
judiciary from
58
directly enjoining the conduct of state officials.
The Court in Edelman also considered whether the State of
Illinois had waived the bar of the eleventh amendment, and
concluded that a state neither constructively nor actually waived its
constitutional immunity from suit merely by participating in a
program through which the federal government provided assistance for the operation of a state system of public aid. Such a
waiver could be found "only where stated 'by the most express
language or by such overwhelming implications from the text [of a
federal-state agreement] as [will] leave no room for any other
reasonable construction.' )159
A.

The Ramifications of Edelman
The Edelman decision creates an inconsistency within the
federally-funded welfare programs. While compliance with a fed53 415 U.S. at 663 (citations omitted).

54 The district court injunction in Edelman was such a decree. State funds would have to
be expended in order to conform the conduct of state officials to the court's decree.

55 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
56 415 U.S. at 667-68.
57 The Supreme Court, in finding an eleventh amendment jurisdictional bar to the
award of retroactive benefits from general state revenues, recognized that prospective relief
against the states would often have a greater fiscal impact on their treasuries than the awards
barred by the eleventh amendment. 415 U.S. at 667-68. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See also notes 84-96 and accompanying
text infra.
58 415 U.S. at 668.

" Id. at 673, quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909).
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eral regulation, which requires states to make corrective payments
retroactively in the event of a successful fair hearing challenge,6 0 is
a prerequisite to the continued receipt of federal funds, 6 ' there is
no parallel duty, due to voluntary waiver of the eleventh amendment bar or otherwise, for the state to make such retroactive
payments after a claimant has been unsuccessful at the fair hearing
62
stage and must resort to federal court in order to assert his claim.
This deficiency is even more glaring when it is recognized that a
fair hearing decision will probably be based upon a state regulation
or administrative practice, the invalidity of which will often be the
eventual foundation for the claimant's right of recovery. This
inconsistency results in an anomalous situation which allows compensatory relief to be granted to an individual claimant who has
been injured due to a misapplication of appropriate standards, a
wrong which usually can be corrected at a fair hearing, but denies
such relief to an entire class of claimants who are similarly injured
by the uniform application of an invalid state regulation or policy,
a practice which ordinarily will not be corrected at the fair hearing
level. For retroactive relief these recipients are left to pursue the
alternatives available in the state courts, where decisions too often
reflect a misplaced concern with the fiscal integrity of the state
63
treasury.
Because the state courts typically are reluctant to award retroactive benefits, and the federal courts are currently unable to
compel such payments, there may no longer be an adequate
remedy to ensure continued state compliance with federal requirements.6 4 "No other remedy can effectively deter States from
60 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(18) (1974). See note 41 supra.
61
62

45 C.F.R. §§ 201.3, 201.6 (1973).
The state courts do not present an effective vehicle for the recovery of welfare

benefits that have been wrongfully withheld. In refusing to award such retroactive relief,
state courts often cite the funding difficulties that the public agencies face and the absence of
arbitrary action on the part of the welfare department. In one case, individual litigants were
denied retroactive relief even though no "intolerable financial burden" would have been
placed on the public treasury. Begay v. Graham, 18 Ariz. App. 336, 340, 501 P.2d 964, 968
(1972).
Although federal courts have also exercised discretion in granting retroactive relief,
they are likely to be more concerned with the needs of the litigants than with the effect of
the award on the state treasury. See, e.g., Carr v. Saucier, [1972-1974 Transfer Binder) CCH
Pov. L. REP.
17,786 (D.C. Ga. 1973); Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973); Machado v. Hackney, 299 F. Supp. 644 (W.D. Tex.
1969), vacated, 397 U.S. 593 (1970).
63 See note 62 supra.
64 This result was foreshadowed in Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973),
rev'd sub nom. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), where the court asserted:
[I]f the only relief that could be granted under the Eleventh Amendment here were
an injunction against the continuation of illegal conduct after the date of the
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the strong temptation to cut welfare budgets by circumventing the
stringent requirements of federal law." 65 Of course, federal funds
may be withheld from a noncomplying state program, 6 6 but this is
a drastic sanction which HEW is reluctant to apply. 67 Since this
penalty would only operate prospectively, the intended beneficiaries of the programs would suffer most.
These factors, highlighted by the Edelman decision, will inevitably reinforce the "if in doubt, don't pay" attitude that is presently
built into the welfare administrative system. 68 For even if a state
agency has erroneously withheld welfare payments, it is now quite
likely that actual and potential recipients will never be compensated for their loss.
Circumventing the Impact of Edelman
In light of these problems, the federal courts have recently
attempted to dispose of welfare litigation in a manner which will
avoid the proscription of the Edelman decision, or at least limit its
applicability. For instance, as suggested by the Seventh Circuit, 69 a
B.

decree, the force of federal law could be seriously blunted. The state welfare
officials could withhold benefits in violation of federal law until suit is brought and
a court acts, and retain the illegal savings acquired theretofore. The price would be
paid by the beneficiaries of a federal program in which the state, not incidentally,
agreed to participate and whose regulations it therefore agreed to abide by. 42
U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1381 et seq. An eligible beneficiary who brought suit contemporaneously with the initiation of the welfare officials' illegal practices and eo
instante secured an injunction could obtain all the benefits he was entitled to, but he
would forfeit part of those benefits to the unjust enrichment of the state because he
did not instantly file a complaint or because federal judicial machinery consumes
time.

472 F.2d at 992.
65 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 691-92 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall continued:
Absent any remedy which may act with retroactive effect, state welfare officials
have everything to gain and nothing to lose by failing to comply with the congressional mandate that assistance be paid with reasonable promptness to all eligible
individuals. This is not idle speculation without basis in practical experience. In this
very case, for example, Illinois officials bave knowingly violated since 1968 a federal
regulation on the strength of an argument as to its invalidity which even the
Without a retroactive-payment remedy,
majority deems unworthy of discussion ....
we are indeed faced with "the spectre of a state, perhaps calculatingly, defying
federal law and thereby depriving welfare recipients of the financial assistance
Congress thought it was giving them."
Id. at 692, quoting Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 995 (7th Cir. 1972).
66 45 C.F.R. § 201.6 (1974).
67 See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 426 (1970) (Douglas, J., concurring). See note 98
infra.
68 This attitude is also supported, in part, by federal regulations
that impose penalties if
a state exceeds a certain percentage of overpayments. 45 C.F.R. § 205.41 (1974), as amended,
39 Fed. Reg. 37,195 (1974). See Note, 1974 Developments In Welfare Law-Aid To Families with
Dependent Children, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 857, 858 (1975).
69 See note 64 supra.
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federal court is not without power under the eleventh amendment
to issue a preliminary injunction against a state official, because such
relief merely enjoins that official's behavior prospectively. Once the
preliminary injunction has been issued, further injury to the recipients is prevented. 70 If the preliminary injunction can be obtained
immediately after the implementation of regulations or practices
that are either unconstitutional or, as is more commonly the case in
welfare litigation, contrary to the federal statute or regulations, the
inability to recover benefits retroactively would not cause the irreparable harm that ordinarily accompanies a wrongful deprivation of welfare benefits. 7 1 Accordingly, with the knowledge that a
subsequent award of retroactive benefits is unavailable, the federal
courts should be more disposed toward issuing preliminary injunc72
tive relief.
Unfortunately, a federal court will enjoin the application of a
state regulation or practice only where the petitioners have established that: (1) there is a strong possibility that they will prevail on
the merits at the final hearing; (2) absent such relief, they will
suffer irreparable injury; and (3) the harm to the state's interest
caused by the granting of the injunction is outweighed by the
injury which will be sustained by the petitioners if such relief is
withheld. 73 Because a termination or reduction in welfare benefits
ordinarily will deprive the recipient of essentials such as food,
70 This was the case in Mothers' & Children's Rights Organization v. Sterrett,
[1972-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP. 15,384 (N.D. lnd. 1972), affd mem., 409
U.S. 809 (1972), where, in accordance with a preliminary injunction against the termination
of categorical assistance henefits without a predetermination hearing, the welfare department was temporarily restrained from failing to issue a recipient's AFDC check for the
coming month.
71 This technique is exemplified by the decision in J.A. and M.M. v. Riti, 377 F. Supp.
1046 (D.N.J. 1974), where the court issued a preliminary injunction restraining the enforcement of a state statute and regulation which suspended AFDC payments to individuals
convicted of welfare fraud. It was alleged that this practice was inconsistent with the Social
Security Act. The AFDC recipient had shown the possibility of irreparable harm and had
raised serious questions concerning the validity of the statute and regulation involved,
thereby warranting issuance of the preliminary injunction.
72 This tendency should be strengthened by recently enacted HEW regulations that
allow a state to recover inappropriately paid welfare benefits, including those paid pursuant
to a preliminary injunction which is vacated or those paid pursuant to an unfavorable lower
court decision which is eventually reversed. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(12) (1974). See also
Developments in Welfare Law-1973, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 859, 949-50 (1974). This reasoning is
equally applicable to the issuance of a stay of a district court order pending appeal.
73 See Winkleman v. New York Stock Exch., 445 F.2d 786, 789 (3d Cir. 1971); A.L.K.
Corp. v. Columbia Picture Indus., Inc., 440 F.2d 761, 763 (3d Cir. 1971); Serritella v.
Engelman, 339 F. Supp. 738, 756 (D.N.J. 1972); Rochester v. Ingram, 337 F. Supp. 350, 352
(D. Del. 1972).
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clothing, housing, and medical care, 4 such action will often result
in the irreparable injury required for the implementation of preliminary relief. A deprivation of this kind, especially if imposed on
a class of welfare claimants, should also be sufficient to outweigh
the harm to the state's fiscal interest caused by the issuance of the
injunction.7 5 However, in many instances welfare litigants will be
unable to show a substantial likelihood of eventual success on the
merits, since their claims frequently rest on novel challenges to
state practices which depart from federal statutes or regulations.
A related problem which may be encountered by a welfare
litigant seeking an immediate injunction arises from the doctrine
that permits a single district court judge to enjoin the operation of
a state statute in conflict with federal law, 7 6 but requires a threejudge district court to enjoin a state statute or regulation whose
constitutionality is in issue. 7 7 Since the convening of a three-judge
court is a cumbersome and time-consuming process, injunctive
relief premised solely on constitutional grounds often will not be
obtained before the petitioners have suffered significant injury
through the loss of unrecoverable benefits. However, this problem
will ordinarily be avoided, since challenges to state categorical
assistance programs, in addition to alleging constitutional
infirmities, generally charge that the programs fail to conform to
the structure required by the Social Security Act and its regulations.

78

In addition to awarding prospective relief at the earliest possible stage of a controversy, some courts have attempted to limit the
effect of the eleventh amendment by narrowing the scope of the
Supreme Court's holding in Edelman, and by fashioning remedies
distinguishable from the one sought therein. For example, in
Rodriguez v. Swank,7 9 the Seventh Circuit, in the face of an eleventh
amendment challenge, affirmed a prospective monetary award
against the state by giving Edelman an exceedingly narrow interpretation.
The facts in Rodriguez closely paralleled those in Edelman. In
October 1970, the district court ordered the Illinois Department of
71 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970). Determination that a person is
ineligible for welfare may also render him ineligible for participation in state-financed
medical programs. See N.Y. Soc. WELFARE Law § 366 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
7' See Serritella v. Engelman, 339 F. Supp. 738, 756 (D.N.J. 1972).
76 Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
77 Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543 (1974).
78 See Note, COLUM. L. REV., supra note 7.
T9 496 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
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Public Aid to process all applications for assistance under the
AFDC program within thirty days from the time of filing. 0 In
February 1972, a supplemental order was entered to enforce
compliance. Incomplete compliance persisted, and a motion for
further remedies was made in October 1972. Rejecting the "presumptive eligibility" remedy, whereby an applicant whose AFDC
application has not been processed for thirty days is presumed
eligible and is immediately mailed an assistance check,81 the court
ordered that after February 1, 1973, "any AFDC application pending more than thirty days, through no fault of the applicant, and
subsequently acted upon favorably, will entitle the applicant to
$100, compensatory damages in addition to the regular benefits
received.18 2 This court-ordered penalty undoubtedly was motivated by frustration; over a two year period the court had unsuccessfully attempted to secure compliance with the federal regulations by the Illinois Department of Public Aid.83 The court concluded that the state had demonstrated it would not comply with
the federal regulations or a court order without the threat of
monetary liability.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit, in light of the Edelman decision, reviewed the validity of this prospective penalty against the
state.8 4 Relying upon the Supreme Court's finding that the eleventh
amendment operated as a bar to an order that "requires payment
of state funds . . . as a form of compensation to those whose

applications were processed"8 5 in violation of federal regulations
"at a time when [state officials were] under no court-imposed
obligation to conform to a different standard,"' 6 the court of
appeals reasoned that such an order was not outside the power of
the federal courts when the state officials had, in fact, been under a
"court-imposed obligation to conform to a different standard. 8 7
The fiscal impact of this order was characterized as the "necessary
result of attempts to gain compliance with a decree which by its
80 The initial order had required compliance with the federal regulations, Rodriguez v.
Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289, 296 (N.D. Ili. 1970), aff'd, 403 U.S. 901 (1971), which in turn
required disposition of applications and receipt of the first assistance check within 30 days of
application. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC AssisTANCE ADMINISTRATION pt. IV, § 2300(b)(5) (1968).
81 See Class v. Norton, 376 F. Supp. 496 (D. Conn. 1974). See also note 101 infra.
82 496 F.2d at 1111 (emphasis in court order of Nov. 9, 1972).
83 Id.
84 Rodriguez v. Swank, 496 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1974).

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974).
8 Id.
87 496 F.2d at 1112, quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974).
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terms was prospective in nature" 88 -a consequence found to be
permissible in Edelman. This decision enables a federal court to
enjoin the activities of state officials and, at the same time, to order

the payment of damages by the state should the injunction be
violated in the future.
This analysis, although reaching an equitable, practical, and
perhaps necessary, result, 89 does not do justice to the Supreme
Court's pronouncements in Edelman. ° The permissible ancillary
effect on the state treasury that Edelman contemplated occurred as

the result of expenses necessarily incurred by state officials in
shaping their conduct to the court's decrees, not from the satisfaction of a penalty assessed for their violation. 9 1 The Rodriguez court
found that the prospective nature of the relief granted, and that

officials would have to violate a court-imposed obligation,
sufficiently distinguished this relief from Edelman's award so that
the eleventh amendment bar was avoided. But this analysis overlooks the true impact of the eleventh amendment, which deprives
the federal courts of the authority to direct an expenditure of state

funds as compensation to parties injured by state activity. 92 Although the Edelman holding is limited to the precept that the
eleventh amendment bars an award of retroactive monetary relief
against a state unless it has waived its eleventh amendment objec:8

Id. at 1113.

9 "The power to order compliance with federal regulations would be meaningless if

the injunction were unenforceable." Id. at 1112-13.
90 See notes 52-58 and accompanying text supra.
91 [T]he fiscal consequences to state treasuries . . . were the necessary result of
compliance with decrees which by their terms were prospective in nature. State
officials, in order to shape their official conduct to the mandate of the Court's
decrees, would more likely have to spend money from the state treasury than if
they had been left free to pursue their previous course of conduct. Such an
ancillary effect on the state treasury is a permissible and often an inevitable
consequence ....
415 U.S. at 667-68.
92 [Ihe Eleventh Amendment does not prevent a federal court from directing a
state official to bring his conduct into conformity with federal law ...
... [However] any judgment declaring a liability which must be met from the
public funds of the state does come within the reach of the Eleventh Amendment;
and a court will, absent the state's consent, be deemed without jurisdiction to enter
such a judgment.
Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1972).
It is one thing to tell the Commissioner of Social Services that he must comply
with the federal standards for the future if the state is to have the benefit of federal
funds in the programs he administers. It is quite another thing to order the
Commissioner to use state funds to make reparation for the past. The latter would
appear to us to fall afoul of the Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional
provision is to be conceived of as having any present force.
467 F.2d at 236-37 (footnotes omitted).
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tion by consenting to the suit, :3 there is strong language in the
opinion indicating that, absent consent, no monetary judgment
payable from a state treasury may be awarded by a federal court. 94
In summarizing its decision, the Court states that "a federal court's
remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is
necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, and may not
include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds
from the state treasury."9 5 While this edict does not by its terms
encompass a prospective award which requires payment of funds
from the state treasury, such as that ordered in Rodriguez, the
Supreme Court has never permitted the recovery of monetary
damages against a state within the context of eleventh amendment
96
litigation.

The order upheld in Rodriguez goes beyond a grant of prospective injunctive relief with its necessary ancillary effect on state
treasuries. It operates immediately against the general revenues of
the state by requiring a direct payment therefrom as compensation
7
to parties injured by acts previously engaged in by state officialsY
93 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); see also Rochester v. White, 503 F.2d 263
(3d Cir. 1974).
"' We do not read Ex parte Young or subsequent holdings of this Court to indicate that any form of relief may be awarded against a state officer, no matter
how closely it may in practice resemble a money judgment payable out of the state
treasury, so long as the relief may be labeled "equitable" in nature.
415 U.S. at 666.
5 415 U.S. at 677 (citations omitted).
96 Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 993 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
97 Oddly, the Seventh Circuit had considered this a fatal distinction when it originally
upheld the award of retroactive benefits which was eventually denied by Edelman. In
expressing its opinion that an award of damages against the state was barred by the eleventh
amendment and so was beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts, the court stated:
[W]e think the remedy afforded here was that of restitution, which "differs greatly
from the damages and penalties which may be awarded." Plaintiffs here did not
seek relief for consequential damages caused by defendant's failure to disburse
their full statutory entitlement. Rather, incident to the injunctive relief prayed for,
they asked that exactly measured benefits retained by defendants which would have
been paid out but for a violation of federal law be paid over to them.
472 F.2d at 993, quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946).
The Rodriguez court did order relief for consequential damages caused by the defendants' failure to disburse appropriately the plaintiffs' statutory entitlement. Yet the case can
only be distinguished on two grounds: (1) in the Rodriguez case the state was under a
court-imposed obligation which enjoined its conduct, while in Edelman the obligation was
legislatively imposed; and (2) in Rodriguez the state had been forewarned that a penalty
would he imposed if the federal injunction was violated:
As the text suggests, these distinctions were given more importance by the Seventh
Circuit in Rodriguez than was justified by the Spreme Court's opinion in Edelman. The
conclusion is that the Supreme Court considered any monetary damages award against a
state to he barred by the eleventh amendment.
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However, without the ability to make an award such as the one
granted in Rodriguez, the federal courts may be powerless to
compel state compliance with the federal welfare scheme. As a
result, the possibility of virtually unlimited state administerial abuse
of welfare programs may become a reality. 98
A situation potentially more detrimental to welfare recipients
would exist if a state refused to obey a federal injunction ordering the
termination of a wrongful withholding of benefits. Class v. Norton,99
decided three days prior to the decision inEdelman, indicates the type
of relief which may be implemented to curtail such state noncompliance with federal programs while simultaneously maintaining
the integrity of the eleventh amendment. Class suggests that Edelman
would be inapplicable to a suit for benefits that were withheld in
violation of a federal injunction. 0 0
Class involved a factual situation similar to both Rodriguez and
Edelman. In June 1972, the district court ordered the Connecticut
Commissioner of Welfare to comply with the applicable federal
regulations for eligibility determinations and commencement of
assistance. 1 1 Almost two years later there remained substantial and
98 The Rodriguez case is a prime example of state administerial abuse since the state
welfare agency continued to refuse assistance within the federal time limitations for two
years after the federal court had ordered it to do so. One possible remedy for such delays
would be for federal courts to hold state welfare officials in contempt for violation of a
federal injunction. However, the federal courts are reluctant to do this. See, e.g., Class v.
Norton, 376 F. Supp. 396, 500-01 (D. Conn. 1974). Without the threat of penalty or the
ability to award retroactive benefits, "the force of federal law could be seriously blunted. The
state welfare officials could withhold benefits in violation of federal law until suit is brought
and a court acts, and retain the illegal savings acquired theretofore." Jordan v. Weaver, 472
F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See also
notes 64-65 and accompanying text supra.
Nor is the statutory sanction of terminating federal aid a solution to the problem, for it
is a drastic sanction and has rarely been imposed by HEW. See G. COOPER, C. BERGER, P.
DODYK, M. PAULSEN, P. SCHRAG & M. SOVERN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND POVERTY
343-44 (2d ed. 1973). In fact, HEW has seldom held a conformity hearing. See CENTER ON
SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND LAW, 3 MATERIALS ON WELFARE LAW 425 (1972).
99 376 F. Supp. 496 (D. Conn.), modified, 505 F.2d 123 (1974). Although this decision
was rendered prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Edelman, the district court subsequently denied a motion for relief from judgment which suggests that the relief granted in
Cas= did not run afoul of the eleventh amendment. Class v. Norton, 376 F. Supp. 503 (D.
Conn. 1974); see note 104 and accompanying text infra.
100 376 F. Supp. at 506.
101 On June 16, 1972, a memorandum and decision was filed ordering the Connecticut

Commissioner of Welfare to comply with applicable federal regulations by determining the
eligibility of applicants for welfare assistance under the state AFDC program within 30 days
from the date of application for assistance. If no determination of eligibility had been made
by the end of the 30-day period, the Commissioner was ordered to presume that the
applicant was eligible for assistance and to mail checks accordingly. The Commissioner was
further ordered to make assistance effective from a date no later than the date of
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widespread noncompliance with the order.10 2 Whereas in Rodriguez
welfare applicants were receiving the appropriate benefits at a date
later than required by federal regulations, Connecticut's violation
of the federal injunction resulted in both the delayed receipt of
benefits and the payment of amounts that were below the standards required by federal law. Moreover, in contrast to Edelman,
this situation continued for almost two years after a federal court
order had enjoined the practices involved. To remedy this situation
and to properly implement its prior orders, the district court
ordered the examination of all "active" and "inactive" cases involving persons who had applied for AFDC benefits subsequent to the
date of filing of the original suit. The court sought to determine
whether these recipients and former recipients were eligible for
benefits retroactive to the date of application, 0 " and directed the
04
payment of such retroactive benefits.'
Ostensibly, this award of benefits fell within the ambit of the
eleventh amendment. Although granted to enforce a federal injunction, rather than a federal regulation, the relief appeared to be
the same type of award against a state which Edelman held to be
beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts-a grant of retroactive
payments of statutory benefits found to have been wrongfully
application, regardless of the date of determination of eligibility. In addition, benefits
retroactive to the date of application were ordered for all recipients whose applications had
been approved since the filing of the suit. Class v. White, [1972-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH
Pov. L. REP. 16,314 (D. Conn. 1972). See also Class v. Norton, 376 F. Supp. 496 (D. Conn.

1974).
102

Not only were applications neglected for more than 30 days, but in some cases the

welfare department had refused to make assistance effective from the date of application.
Class v. Norton, 376 F. Supp. 496 (D. Conn. 1974). To correct this continued violation of the
injunction, petitioners sought citation of the defendant Commissioner of Welfare for
contempt and issuance of an injunction preventing the use of federal funds for the state
AFDC program. The court, however, refrained from implementing these drastic measures.
103 Those who had not received assistance effective from a date no later than the date
of application, as required by the original order, were eligible for such relief. Class v. White,
[1972-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP.
16,314 (D. Conn. 1972).
104 Class v. Norton, 376 F. Supp. 496 (D. Conn. 1974). This retroactive award of
benefits can be divided into two categories: (1) payments for violations of the federal
regulations which occurred subsequent to the filing of the suit, but prior to the issuance of
the original injunction; and (2) the award of benefits which were withheld subsequent to the
injunctions issued on June 16, and June 22, 1972, and which were in violation of those
injunctions. The first category was dearly within the proscription of Edelman and the district
court indicated as much in denying a later motion for relief from judgment. Id. at 506 n.1. It
was an award of retroactive benefits which were wrongfully withheld. The fund from which
the award was to be satisfied would inevitably have been the general revenues of the state.
The second category of benefits, however, was not discussed in Edelman and will be the
subject of the following textual discussion. See notes 105-08 and accompanying text infra.
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withheld. 10 5 However, if this argument were to prevail, the federal
courts would be unable to enforce effectively state conformity with
the federal welfare scheme, because absent the availability of viable
sanctions, state welfare departments could profit from violating
court injunctions and wrongfully withholding benefits. The Court
in Edelman recognized this problem and indicated that it would
have reached the opposite result had the suit been brought to
10 6
enforce compliance with a previously issued federal injunction.
Under the terms of the eleventh amendment, 10 7 there is no
basis for distinguishing between situations in which the state is
under an obligation imposed by a federal statute or regulation, and
one imposed by a federal court. Nevertheless, because the Court in
Ex parte Young °8 held that the eleventh amendment was not a bar
to injunctive relief against a state official, some vehicle for enforcement of those injunctions must be made available to the
federal courts. To protect the integrity of the federal courts,
without negating the effect of the eleventh amendment,1 0 9 the only
practical solution is to allow a federal court to grant such monetary
awards for the sole purpose of enforcing its injunctions.
Other tactics may be employed, when suing in the federal
courts, to avoid the effect of the eleventh amendment. First,
welfare litigants may sue state officials in their individual capacity
rather than in their official capacity.1 10 Thus, any amounts found to
be due would be paid from the personal resources of the officials
and not from the general revenues of the state. However, in
addition to being an impractical solution in a class action, where
the liability may be extremely large, this procedure will be unavailable in most situations because state officers are protected by the
doctrine of official immunity. This doctrine shields state officials
105 "[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from

public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment." 415 U.S. at 663.
106 Id. at 668. This would be exemplified by a situation in which the state had been
under a court imposed obligation to conform to a standard which was not being upheld, and
the award contemplated was limited to those benefits to which the recipients were entitled
under the applicable welfare statute.
107 See note 44 supra.
108 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
109 Although the relief in Norton was granted prior to the Supreme Coures decision in
Edelman, the defendant later moved for relief from judgment on the ground that Edelman
required a contrary result. Although the court rested its denial of the motion on other

grounds, its consideration of Edelman's effect on the relief granted was consistent with this
analysis. Class v. Norton, 376 F. Supp. 503, 506 (1974).
110 Whereas state officials sued in their official capacity are immune from monetary
judgment under the eleventh amendment, state officials sued in their individual capacity are

not. Carey v. White, 375 F. Supp. 1327, 1329 (D. Del. 1974).
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from liability, despite a violation of constitutional rights, if their
acts were within the range of permissible discretion or within the
scope of their duties, and were committed in good faith.1 11
Another approach, implied by the Supreme Court in Edelman, calls for a suit against the county or other subdivision of the
state administering the welfare program. 1 In noting that for
eleventh amendment purposes a county does not occupy the same
position as a state,1 1 3 the Court indicated that an award of retroactive benefits could be made in such a suit. Although such a suit
would not have as broad an effect on welfare programs as a suit
against the state, it would be better directed towards obtaining the
appropriate relief for the litigants involved and could be brought
together with a suit against the state for an injunction in order to
achieve the desired statewide effect.1 1 4
CONCLUSION

Although it is feared that by its liberal expression of the
"substantial question" requirement the Hagans decision will open the
floodgates of the federal courts to welfare litigation, the Edelman
decision, by eliminating the power of the federal courts to grant
the essential remedy of retroactive benefits, makes it clear that this
will only be of benefit to those who desire statewide reform of the
categorical assistance programs. Other individuals and groups of
claimants who merely seek compensation for desperately needed
benefits that have been wrongfully withheld are left to either the
beneficence of the less-than-friendly state courts or the make-shift
measures currently being initiated by the federal courts.
The present situation can only be remedied by an amendment
to the Social Security Act providing for an express waiver of the
111 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th
Cir.), cert. granted, 419 U.S. 894 (1974); Carey v. White, 375 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Del. 1974);
Taliaferro v. State Council of Higher Educ., 372 F. Supp. 1378 (E.D. Va. 1974).
112 This approach is only available in those states which have subdivisions that actually
administer the welfare programs.
113 415 U.S. at 667 n.12.
14 Another suggestion which has heen advanced calls for the federal court to remand
the case to the fair hearing level where the federal regulations require the retroactive
payment of henefits wrongfully withheld. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(18) (1974). See note 41 and
accompanying text supra. A limitation on this method is that there must have been a fair
hearing prior to the federal litigation. As exhaustion of state administrative remedies prior
to adjudication is not generally required hy the federal courts in welfare litigation, the
practice until now has been to bypass the fair hearing entirely in many instances and
institute an action directly in a federal court. See generally Note, CORNELL L. REv.,supra note 7, at
807-09.
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immunity afforded to the states by the eleventh amendment.
Conceivably, such legislation may be stimulated by future attempts
of state welfare officials to abuse the- protection granted by the
Edelman decision.

Arthur J. Fried

Upon the occasion of his retirementfrom thefaculty of the Cornell Law School, the
Board of Editors of the CornellLaw Review and the authors of the articles contained
herein respectfully dedicate this issue to Rudolf B. Schlesinger-teacher,scholar, and
friend.

